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Introduction 
 
Terrorist and extremist movements have long employed every available mass communications 
technology. Examples range from the Irish Republican press in the nineteenth century,1 Marighela’s 
advice to his comrades in 1969 to use photocopiers to reproduce pamphlets and manifestos,2 and 
Hizbollah’s establishment of its Al Manar television station in the early 1990s,3 through to the so-
called ‘Islamic State’s’ (IS) ‘slickly’ produced contemporary digital content.4 For many years, 
scholars interested in the relationship between terrorism and media focused on the role of news 
media, particularly newspapers,5 with terrorism often portrayed as involving the intentional 
manipulation of journalists. Terrestrial and satellite television has also directly impacted on 
terrorism,6 with many terrorism spectaculars, including 9/11, appearing to be specifically 
choreographed for television.  
 
The performative and propagandistic nature of terrorist acts is central to many of the wide variety of 
available definitions of terrorism. According to Schmid and De Graaf:  
 
                                                          
1 See R v John Mitchel (1848) 6 StTr (NS) 599; R v Charles Gavan Duffy (1848) 2 StTr (NS) 795; Martin v R (1848) 3 
Cox CC 318; R v Grey (1865) 10 Cox CC 184; R v Sullivan and Pigott (1868) 11 Cox CC 44. 
2 C Marighella, Mini Manual of the Urban Guerrilla (Abraham Guillen, Montreal 2002) 30. 
3 See B Saul and D Joyce, International Approaches to the Regulation of al-Manar Television and Terrorism Related 
Content (ACMA, Canberra 2010). 
4 See HJ Ingram, ‘Three traits of the Islamic State’s information warfare’ 159 (6) RUSI Journal 4; J Klausen, ‘Tweeting 
the Jihad: social media networks of western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq’ (2015) 38 Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 1. 
5 See M Conway, ‘Introduction: Terrorism and contemporary mediascapes – reanimating research on media and 
terrorism’ (2012) 5 Critical Studies on Terrorism 3. 
6 AP Schmid and J De Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media (Sage, 
London 1982) 16; G Chaliand, Terrorism: From Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle (Saqi Books, London 1985) 13-
14; BH Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, New York 1998) 136-137; SL Carruthers, The Media 
at War (MacMillan, Basingstoke 2000) 168. 
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 Terrorism cannot be understood only in terms of violence. It has to be understood primarily 
in terms of propaganda. Violence and propaganda have much in common. Violence aims at 
behaviour modification by coercion. Propaganda aims at the same through persuasion. 
Terrorism is a combination of the two.7  
 
If the intention of terrorism is to induce terror, then it follows that the ultimate targets are the 
audience rather than direct victims.8 Terrorism has, therefore, often been portrayed as a strategy of 
‘armed propaganda’, calculated to generate maximum response amongst target audiences with the 
purpose of pressurising political leaders to accede to terrorists’ demands.9 Consequently, it is 
relatively unsurprising that governments have responded with robust legal restraints. Amongst the 
most prominent restrictions were those introduced in the Republic of Ireland (1976 – 1994) and the 
UK (1988 – 1994) arising from the Northern Ireland conflict and banning the broadcasts of Loyalist 
and Republican paramilitaries.10  
 
The advent of the internet means that terrorists are no longer wholly reliant on the mass media to act 
as carriers and even intermediaries, because it affords otherwise unattainable prominence and 
meaning to their violence.11 The internet now presents actors, whether mass movements or lone 
actors, with increased opportunities to globally propagate their own interpretations and messages.12 
A variety of other functions can be served by terrorist use of the internet, including information-
gathering, planning, and even the commission of attacks usually through hacking and denial of 
service rather than the more spectacular catastrophes, such as aircraft falling from the sky through 
                                                          
7 Schmid and De Graaf (n 6) 14. See also B de Graaf,  Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance (Routledge, 
Abingdon 2011). 
8 Schmid and De Graaf (n 6) 15. 
9 M Stohl ‘Demystifying the Mystery of International Terrorism’ in CW Kegley (ed), International Terrorism: 
Characteristics; Causes; Controls (St Martin’s, New York 1990) 93. 
10 See C Banwell, ‘The courts’ treatment of the broadcasting bans in Britain and the Republic of Ireland’ (1995) 16 
Journal of Media Law & Practice 21; S Kingston, ‘Terrorism, the media, and the Northern Ireland conflict’ (1995) 18 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 203; J Horgan, ‘Journalists and Censorship: a case history of the NUJ in Ireland and the 
broadcasting ban 1971-94’ (2002) 3 Journalism Studies 377. 
11 See Carruthers (n 6) 170. These media roles sometimes resulted in threats of prosecution either for withholding 
information or for ‘apology’ of terrorism: C Walker, Terrorism and the Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011) ch 
8. 
12 See G Weimann, New Terrorism and New Media (Wilson Center, Washington DC 2014). 
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sabotaged air traffic control systems, that are often elaborated upon in media but have not 
materialised.13 
 
In 1998, approximately half of the (then) 30 groups designated as ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisations’ 
under the US Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 operated websites, including 
the Lebanese Hizbollah, the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers, and others.14 These early websites fulfilled 
largely a ‘broadcast’ function. Their content was tightly controlled by the terrorist organisations, 
and opportunities for interaction were negligible. By the next decade, online forums had become a 
popular format, especially amongst violent jihadis and allowed for much greater levels of 
interactivity.15 Many forums remain active today, but jihadis and their online fans — ‘jihobbyists’16 
— increasingly are having greater recourse to mainstream social media platforms.  
 
IS and their online supporters have proven themselves to be prolific producers and disseminators of 
digital content.17 IS does not have a single official website; instead ‘official’ IS online content 
emanates from several IS-affiliated content production entities or so-called ‘media departments’ 
(such as al-Furqan Media, al-Hayat Media Center) and is distributed via jihadi forums, but 
increasingly also via the major social media platforms and other content-hosting sites. In July 2014, 
the group released the first issue of its Dabiq magazine, similar in style to Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula’s Inspire.18  
 
                                                          
13 See S Gordon and R Ford, ‘Cyberterrorism?’, (2002) 21 Computers & Security 636; G Weimann, ‘Cyberterrorism: 
The Sum of All Fears?’ (2005) 28 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 129; PMS Sundaram and K Jaishankar, 
‘Cyberterrorism’ in F Schmalleger and M Pittaro, Crimes of the Internet (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey 2008). 
14 For Hizbollah’s internet presence, see M Conway, ‘Cybercortical Warfare: Hizbollah’s Internet Strategy’ in S Oates, 
D Owen, and R Gibson (eds), The Internet and Politics: Citizens, Voters and Activists (Routledge, London 2005); an 
analysis of the LTTE’s websites is contained in S Tekwani, ‘The Tamil Diaspora, Tamil Militancy, and the Internet’ in 
KC Ho, R Kluver, and KCC Yang (eds), Asia.Com: Asia Encounters the Internet (RoutledgeCurzon, London 2003). 
Comparative analysis is to be found in M Conway, ‘Terrorist web sites’ in P Seib (ed), Media and Conflict in the 
Twenty-First Century (Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2005). 
15 See K Damphouse, ‘The dark side of the web’ in F Schmalleger and M Pittaro, Crimes of the Internet (Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 2008); AY Zelin, The State of the Global Jihad Online (New America Foundation, 
Washington DC 2012).  
16 J Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (Routledge, London 2009) 19. For Irish Republican sites, see R 
Frennett and MLR Smith, ‘IRA 2.0’ (2012) 24 Terrorism & Political Violence 375. For right-wing groups, see German 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Right-wing Extremists and their Internet Presence (Cologne, 
2013) 
17 See n 4. 
18 See AF Lemieux et al, ‘Inspire Magazine’ (2014) 26 Terrorism & Political Violence 354.  
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The ‘slick’ and ‘glossy’ nature of IS’ online content and its resultant potential attractiveness to, and 
resonance with, discontented ‘digital natives’ (young people who have grown up with the internet) 
has become a source of official apprehension.19 However, the relationship between consumption of 
extremist online content, such as that produced by IS, and the adoption of extremist ideology or of 
recruitment to terrorism remains unproven.20 From the producer perspective, this impact is of 
increasing importance.21 A particular alleged outcome that has received utmost attention is the role 
of online jihadi content influencing young people to travel to Syria as ‘foreign fighters’ and ‘jihadi 
brides’, which gives rise to trepidation about their role in the conflict zone and even more so 
regarding their capacity for future terrorism upon their return home.22  
 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with describing and analysing the responses to the 
foregoing extremist uses of the internet. Much of the following is therefore concerned with what is 
called ‘content control’: efforts on the part of stakeholders to regulate what sort of material is 
available on the internet, including the removal of ‘objectionable’ materials currently accessible and 
the erection of barriers to the uploading of such materials in the future. The latter so-called 
‘negative’ measures may be contrasted with more ‘positive’ approaches.23 ‘Negative’ measures 
describe all those approaches that advocate for, or result, in the deletion or restriction of violent 
extremist online content and/or the legal sanctioning of its online purveyors or users; ‘positive’ 
measures refer to those online initiatives that seek to make an impact through digital engagement 
and education. 
 
 
                                                          
19 See for example, See EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in consultation with the Commission services and the 
EEAS, Foreign Fighters and returnees (16002/14, Brussels 2014) 2-3. 
20 See Home Affairs Committee, Roots of violent radicalisation (2010-12, HC 1446) para 38; I von Behr and others, 
Radicalisation in the Digital Era (RAND, Santa Monica 2013); D Rieger, L Frischlich and G Bente, Propaganda 2.0: 
Psychological Effects of Right-wing and Islamic Extremist Internet Videos (Luchterhand, Munich 2013); DC Benson, 
‘Why the internet is not increasing terrorism’ (2014) 23 Security Studies 293. 
21 See D O’Callaghan and others ‘An analysis of interactions within and between extreme right communities in social 
media’ (2013) Ubiquitous Social Media Analysis 8329, 88; A Fisher and N Prucha, ‘The Call-up: The Roots of a 
Resilient and Persistent Jihadist Presence on Twitter’ (2014) 4(3) CTX Journal (Online). 
22 See UNSCR 2178 of 24 September 2014. 
23 For comprehensive strategic statements in regard to cybersecurity, see Cabinet Office, Cyber security strategy of the 
United Kingdom: safety, security and resilience in cyberspace (Cm 7642, 2009); Cabinet Office, The UK cyber security 
strategy: protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world (London 2011); Department of Homeland Security, 
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Washington DC 2003); Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity; T Legrand, ‘The citadel and its sentinels’ in T Chen, L Jarvis, and S Macdonald (eds), 
Cyberterrorism (Springer, Heidelberg 2014). 
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Content control issues in general 
 
Both Article 19 of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and Article 10 of the 
ECHR identify freedom of expression and the right to seek, receive, and impart information 
(including from foreign countries)24 as fundamental human rights. These grants of right also 
recognise, however, that freedom of expression is counter-balanced by state-imposed limitations for 
the sake of, inter alia, ‘public order’ (UNDHR, article 29) or 'national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime' (ECHR, Article 10(2)). This dichotomous 
international regime, in conjunction with states’ widely differing social, political, and religious 
contexts, added to the absence of any comprehensive international law definition of terrorism,25 
opens many possibilities for variant interpretations and levels of tolerance.26  Uncertainties can also 
arise through differences between the ‘real’ and ‘cyber’ worlds. Existing rules about speech, 
promulgated for application in the real world, can be applied to the internet, as adopted in the EU 
for racist speech.27 However, it is arguable that the internet requires specific legislation tailored to 
its specific characteristics which impart differences in terms of risk and legal attributes. The risk 
factors include quantity (the number, spread, and easy accessibility of messages) as well as quality 
(the intensity and instantaneity of messages and the facility for personal dialogue). The special legal 
attributes include the complexities of trans-jurisdictional impact, the potential for anonymity, and 
the technical expertise and specialist equipment required to gather evidence.28 These risk factors 
and legal attributes become especially troubling when the effects of online extremism may prove so 
pernicious.  
 
In the light of these problems, many countries have introduced internet-content legislation, most of 
it hastily promulgated in the wake of specific terrorist events, such as 9/11 and 7/7. There may be 
some tangible benefits in terms of resolving the boundaries of forbidden conduct. However, there 
                                                          
24 See Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v Sweden App no 23883/06, 16 December 2008 and more generally Társaság 
a Szabadságjogokért v Hungary App no 37374/05, 14 April 2009. 
25 See Chapter 2 (Saul). 
26 For guides, see U Sieber, and PW Brunst, Cyberterrorism (Council of Europe, Strasbourg 2007); MC Golumbic, 
Fighting Terror Online (Springer, New York 2008); Home Office, Safeguarding Online: Explaining the Risk Posed by 
Violent Extremism (London 2009); Y Akdeniz, Freedom of Expression on the Internet (Council of Europe Publishing, 
Strasbourg 2010); UN Office on Drugs and Crime, The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes (Vienna 2012). 
27 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia 
(Brussels 2001) 6, 8. 
28 See generally Y Akdeniz, C Walker, and D Wall, The Internet, Law and Society (Longman, London 2000); I Spiecker 
genannt Döhmann, ‘The Difference between Online and Offline Communication as a Factor in the Balancing of 
Interests with Freedom of Speech’ in CP Walker and RL Weaver, Free Speech in an Internet Era (Carolina Academic 
Press, Durham, NC 2013). 
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are also criticisms in terms of a disproportionately blanket ‘surveillance society’29 affecting the 
rights of all and not just suspects,30 the dubious efficacy of many provisions, and the absence of 
more innovative responses. Even the security authorities appear dissatisfied with the regime, and so, 
as revealed by Edward Snowden, they allegedly practice ‘dataveillance’ on a vast scale in ways 
which may transgress the boundaries of legality.31  
 
‘Negative’ online measures 
 
Successful use of the internet for violent radicalisation and other violent extremist purposes is based 
on the assumption that both users and audiences have access to the messages communicated via the 
internet and also can interact. States therefore believe they can constrain the effectiveness of these 
cyber-based strategies by limiting user and audience access, either by ex ante or post hoc censorship 
of content (such as by criminal law or take-down measures) or by control over internet 
infrastructure (such as by filters and firewalls), or by combination of the two. Some of these 
‘negative’ internet-based counter-terrorism measures involve laws, and some involve voluntary 
codes or regulatory dialogue with communication service providers (‘CSPs’). Illustrations of 
negative content control measures will be derived primarily from official state action in the US, the 
UK and the EU, though unofficial or unattributed cyber-attacks on jihadi and other extremist 
internet presences have also occurred, such as Internet Haganah.32 In the wake of the January 2015 
attacks in Paris, Anonymous launched ‘Op Charlie Hebdo’ with the purpose of disabling jihadi 
forums and social media accounts. They claimed their first victory in this effort via a tweet on 12 
January announcing the takedown of the French-language jihadi forum, Ansar al-Haqq.   
 
 
                                                          
29 See D Lyon, Surveillance After September 11 (Polity, Cambridge 2005); Home Affairs Committee, A Surveillance 
Society? (2007–08 HC 58, and Government Reply, Cm 7449, 2008); House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution, Surveillance: Citizens and the State (2008–09 HL 18, and Government Reply, Cm 7616, 2009); M 
Scheinin, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism (A/HRC/13/37, 2009); C Fuchs and others (eds), Internet and Surveillance (Routledge, New 
York 2011). 
30 See C Walker and Y Akdeniz, ‘Anti-Terrorism laws and data retention: war is over?’ in (2003) 54 Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly 159; Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, 
Marine and Natural Resources and others, 8 April 2014. 
31 See Chapter 10 (Macdonald). Key allegations were rejected in Liberty v GCHQ [2014] UKIPTrib 13_77-H. 
32 See G Weimann, Terror on the Internet (US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC 2006) 199. 
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US negative measures 
 
Controls over internet-based speech are especially contentious in the US context, where the First 
Amendment to the US Constitution prioritises freedom of expression, including the right to publish 
extreme and offensive materials.33 Achieving a proper balance between content control and freedom 
of expression has therefore proven to be a considerable challenge, though the balance is still 
weighted in favour of expression compared to the stance in Europe.  
 
It is for this reason that many extremist and terrorist websites have been hosted in the US. For 
example, in 1997, controversy erupted when it was revealed that the State University of New York 
(SUNY) at Binghamton was hosting the website of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), and that a Tupac Amaru (MRTA) solidarity site was operating out of the University of 
California at San Diego (UCSD).34 SUNY officials promptly shut down the FARC site. In San 
Diego, officials decided in favour of free speech, and the Tupac Amaru site remained in operation 
on UCSD’s servers for some years. It was not illegal at that time to host such a site, even if a group 
was designated a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisation’ by the US Department of State, as long as a site 
was not seeking financial contributions nor providing financial support to the group. This toleration 
persists even after 9/11. For instance, though listed in 2011 by the UN 1267 Committee and by the 
US as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (‘SDGT’) under US Executive Order 13224, and 
proscribed in the UK in 2013,35 Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate) remains available on the 
internet through the sympathetic Kavkaz Centre (www.kavkazcenter.com) which is hosted by 
Cloudflare in the US. 
 
The principal qualification to free speech since 9/11 has been the more aggressive usage of the anti-
terrorist offences of material support.36 First, 18 USC section 2339A, enacted in 1994,37 addresses 
                                                          
33 See Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444 (1969); Hess v Indiana 414 US 105 (1972); RAV v St Paul 505 US 377 (1992). 
The strength of the priority may have become less rigorous: T Healey, ‘Brandenburg in time of terror’ (2009) 84 Notre 
Dame Law Review 655. Compare for the UK, D Barnum, ‘Indirect incitement and freedom of speech in Anglo-
American law’ [2006] European Human Rights Law Review 258.   
34 See M Conway, ‘Terrorism and Internet governance: core issues’ (2007) 3 Disarmament Forum 23. 
35 Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (no 2) Order 2013 SI 2013/3172. 
36 See RM Chesney, ‘The sleeper scenario’ (2005) Harvard Journal on Legislation 1 and ‘Federal prosecution of 
terrorism related offences’ (2007) 11 Lewis & Clark Law Review 851; D Cole, ‘Terror financing, guilt by association 
and the paradigm of prevention in the “war on terror”’ in A Bianchi and A Keller, Counterterrorism (Hart, Oxford 
2008); J Ward, ‘The root of all evil’ (2008) 84 Notre Dame Law Review 471. 
37 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 1994, PL 103-322 s 120005. 
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the provision directly or indirectly of financial or other material support or resources knowing or 
intending their use for terrorist activities as being forbidden by thirty-six listed offences. Proof of 
intent is required that the recipient is a terrorist group (even recklessness is not sufficient and 
certainly not negligence).38 By 18 USC s 2339B,39 it is an offence without any requirement of intent 
or belief as to the terrorist nature of the acts to be aided40 to provide material support or resources 
(including to oneself) to a designated ‘Foreign Terrorist Organization’41 (Al-Qa’ida was listed in 
1999). Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act, sections 803 to 815, also known as the International 
Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act 2001,42 augmented sections 2339A 
and 2339B. It widened the notion of ‘material support or resources’ by including, for example, 
expert advice or assistance. 
 
Though just a handful of speech-related prosecutions have arisen, free speech activists fail to be 
convinced that there is any clear and present danger of imminent harmful action.43 In US v Iqbal 
and Elahwal,44 Iqbal pleaded guilty to providing material support to Hizballah (also a designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organization) by operating a satellite television service known as HDTV Limited, 
which carried Al Manar and for which Iqbal was directly paid thousands of dollars by Al Manar. 
Next, in 2012, Tarek Mehanna, was sentenced to more than 17 years’ imprisonment for conspiracy 
to provide material support to Al-Qa’ida, providing material support to terrorists (and conspiracy to 
do so), conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, conspiracy to make false statements to 
the FBI, and two counts of making false statements.45 His internet-related material support arose 
from, among other things, translating and posting on the internet Al-Qa’ida recruitment videos and 
other documents, including some that encouraged violence against American military forces.  
 
                                                          
38 But see US v Lakhani 480 F 3d 171 (2007). 
39 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996, PL 104-132, s 303. 
40 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 2004, PL 108-458, s 6603(c)(2) clarified that knowledge (but 
still not recklessness or negligence) is confined to the fact that the group is designated or has engaged in terrorism. 
41 8 USC s 1189(a)(1), inserted by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996, s 302 (see also 31 CFR s 
597.101-901). 
42 PL 107-56. 
43 See Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444 (1969). Note also 32 County Sovereignty Committee v Department of State 292 
F 3d 797 (2002). 
44 (2008) USDC, SDNY. 
45 (2012) USDC, SDNY, cert den 547 US (2014). See N Abel, ‘United States v. Mehanna, The First Amendment, and 
Material Support in the War on Terror’ (2013) 54 Boston College Law Review 711; GD Brown, ‘Notes on a Terrorism 
Trial – Preventive Prosecution, “Material Support” and The Role of The Judge after United States v. Mehanna’ (2012) 4 
Harvard National Security Journal 1; EG Knox, ‘Slippery Slope of Material Support Prosecutions: Social Media 
Support to Terrorists’ (2014) 66 Hastings Law Journal 295. 
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The constitutionality of the material support offences was upheld by the US Supreme Court in 2010 
against challenges based on free speech and vagueness in Holder v Humanitarian Law Project.46 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr declared that for speech to qualify as material support for 
terrorism, it had to be ‘expert advice or assistance’ delivered ‘in coordination with or under the 
control of’ a designated foreign terrorist organization; ‘independent advocacy’ of a terror group’s 
ideology, aims or methods is not a crime.47 Justice Roberts underlined that ‘under the material 
support statute, plaintiffs may say anything they wish on any topic’ and pointed out that ‘Congress 
has not sought to suppress ideas or opinions in the form of “pure political speech”’.48 Despite these 
statements, the Mehanna conviction suggests that individuals can be convicted of terrorism offences 
on the basis of online speech acts with very tenuous links to notions of financing or support by 
deed. 
 
A commitment to First Amendment rights is equally the reason put forward by major US social 
media companies, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, for their decisions to decline to censor 
some of the violent extremist content posted to their sites. US lawmakers have been amongst those 
exhorting Twitter and YouTube to cancel accounts they view as ‘terrorist’.49 In response, Twitter 
has adopted the mantra of being ‘the free speech wing of the free speech party’50 and has in the past 
refused requests from government officials, activist organizations, and concerned individuals to 
cancel the accounts of, amongst others, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Afghan Taliban, and Syria’s 
violent Jihadi faction Jabhat al-Nusra. However, its policy began to shift in 2012 towards a more 
country-specific approach,51 and, in January 2013, Twitter cancelled the account of Somalia’s al-
Shabab following the group tweeting photographs of the body of a French commando whom they 
had killed followed by explicit threats to execute Kenyan hostages they held.52 In the event, al-
                                                          
46 561 US 1 (2010). See P Marguiles, ‘Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech’ 
(2011-2012) 63 Hastings Law Journal 455; A Tomkins, ‘Criminalizing Support for Terrorism: A Comparative 
Perspective’ (2011) 6 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy 81; D Cole, ‘The First Amendment’s 
Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine’ (2012) 6 Harvard Law & 
Policy Review 148. 
47 Ibid. 18-20. 
48 Ibid. 20-21.  
49 See B Farmer, ‘Congress calls on Twitter to block Taliban’ Daily Telegraph Online (London, 25 December 2011); J 
Gettleman, ‘As militants use Twitter, U.S. explores boundaries; Officials say government is examining options to close 
Al Shabab’s account’ International Herald Tribune (Paris, 21 December 2011) 3; Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 
and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives, Jihadist Use Of Social Media - 
How to Prevent Terrorism and Preserve Innovation (Serial No 112-62, Washington DC, 6 December 2011).  
50 See E Barnett, ‘Twitter chief: We will protect our users from Government’ Daily Telegraph Online (London, 18 
October 2011).  
51 See J Taylor, ‘Twitter faces user backlash over move to censor messages’ Independent (London, 28 January 2012) 
10.  
52 See ‘Twitter bars Islamists’ account in English’ Daily Telegraph (London, 26 January 2013) 18.  
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Shabab reestablished their Twitter account, under a slightly different name, almost immediately, 
and Twitter was once again embroiled in controversy when the group live Tweeted their attack on 
the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013.53 Twitter appears to have shifted 
its position somewhat since, engaging in a wholesale cull of violent jihadi accounts from mid-2014 
possibly, according to one analyst, at the behest of the US Government and almost certainly also 
influenced by the use of these accounts to spread images from and links to beheading videos.54  
 
These verdicts by CSPs of life and death over social media accounts highlight the lack of 
transparency surrounding how decisions are taken as to which accounts are cancelled and why. 
Twitter have no detailed and publicly available guidelines on the matter but merely report on 
requests,55 as does Google.56 The Edward Snowden revelations also alleged on-going contacts with 
state agencies which have become embarrassing for CSPs.57 
 
UK negative measures 
 
Compared to the US, the UK anti-terrorism laws contain a more comprehensive catalogue of 
criminal offence and take-down measures, with less restraint in their application, though the results 
often remain controversial.58  
 
Reflecting the pursuit of precursor crimes, the mainstay offences dealing with extremist materials 
on the internet are sections 57 and 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Section 57(1) is contravened by 
possession of an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the 
                                                          
53 See H Alexander, ‘Tweeting terrorism’ Daily Telegraph Online (London, 22 September 2013).  
54 See D Friedman, ‘Twitter kills ISIS accounts over threats, denies fiends propaganda win’ Daily News (New York, 17 
August 2014) 12.  
55 All content removal requests directed at Twitter are however posted on the Chilling Effects website at 
<http://www.chillingeffects.org> last accessed 20 January 2014.  
56 See <http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/> last accessed 20 January 2014.  
57 They have proposed greater use of encryption in response: ‘Yahoo joins Google in effort to protect users’ emails from 
prying eyes’ Daily Telegraph Online (London, 8 August 2014).  
58 See C Walker, ‘Cyber-terrorism: Legal principle and the law in the United Kingdom’ (2006) 110 Penn State Law 
Review 625; M Conway, ‘Terrorism and the internet: new media, new threat?’ (2006) 59 Parliamentary Affairs, 283; I 
Cram, Terror and the War on Dissent - Freedom of Expression in the Age of Al-Qaeda, (Springer, Berlin 2009); A 
Carlile and S Macdonald, ‘The criminalisation of terrorist online preparatory acts’ in T Chen, L Jarvis and S Macdonald 
(eds), Cyberterrorism (Springer, Heidelberg 2014); CP Walker, The Anti-Terrorism Legislation (3rd ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2014) chs 2, 6.  
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possession is for a purpose connected with terrorism. The articles possessed will often be lawful in 
themselves and even commonplace. Regarding multiple-use articles such as computer disks or cars, 
section 57(1) only requires ‘a’ purpose to be nefarious, not a main or sole purpose. In R v Omar 
Altimini,59 computer materials held by a ‘sleeper’ contravened section 57. Recognizing possible 
overreach, section 57(2) offers a defence by proof on an evidentiary basis according to R v Director 
of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene60 that possession of the article was not for a purpose 
connected with terrorism. The offence is highly valued by police and prosecutors. Since 2006, 
sentences have increased and include 12 years (‘the top of the spectrum’) for a vast collection of 
propaganda and instructional guides, observations of security at Manchester Airport, and musings 
about attacks.61  
 
Even more relevant are the offences under section 58. Section 58(1) contains two variants of actus 
reus: collecting or making a record of information likely to be useful to terrorism or possessing a 
document or record containing information of that kind. A ‘record’ includes electronic formats 
(section 58(2)). The defendant must be aware of the nature of the contents.62 However, the Crown is 
also not required to show that the defendant harboured a terrorist purpose. In R v K, the defendant, 
Khalid Khaliq, argued boldly that section 58 was insufficiently certain to comply with Article 7 of 
the European Convention. In response, the Court of Appeal sought to remedy any imprecision by 
reading in the requirement of a purpose useful to terrorism. Thus, the purpose of the information 
(rather than the possessor) is at stake — it intrinsically ‘calls for an explanation’.63 The information 
must be of an intrinsic kind which gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that it is likely to provide 
practical assistance to a person committing or preparing terrorism rather than simply encouraging 
the commission of terrorism. To illustrate, the A–Z of London could be useful to a terrorist in the 
location of a target, but that use would not fall within section 58 since that document does not 
intrinsically arouse suspicion.64 In R v Terence Roy Brown, an internet seller of literature, such as The 
Anarchist Cookbook, which he admitted was useful to terrorists, was convicted even though he viewed 
his activities as a non-ideological business on which he paid taxes.65 By section 58(3), it is a defence to 
prove a ‘reasonable excuse’. Section 58 is commonly invoked against those who download and 
                                                          
59 [2008] EWCA Crim 2829. 
60 [2000] 2 AC 326. 
61 R v Sultan Muhammed and Aabid Hassain Khan [2009] EWCA Crim 2653, para 13. 
62 R v G and J [2009] UKHL 13, paras 47, 48. 
63 See further R v Samina Malik [2008] EWCA Crim 185, para 14; R v G and J [2009] UKHL 13, paras 43, 44  
64 [2008] EWCA Crim 1450. 
65 [2011] EWCA Crim 2751, paras 17, 34. 
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disseminate extremist internet material. In R v Khuram Shazad Iqbal,66 the defendant (aka ‘Abu 
Irhaab’) had used Facebook and Twitter to post links to 848 examples of extreme content (videos 
and articles) on the internet and was found with nine copies of the Al-Qa’ida magazine Inspire on 
his laptop.  
 
There have been 76 charges under section 57 and 44 under section 58 from September 11, 2001 to 31 
March 2013 (out of 375 under anti-terrorism legislation).67 The main controversies surrounding these 
offences concern the equivocal nature of the actions involved and the switched burden of proof of 
reasonable excuse. Journalists and even scholars can in theory fall foul,68 as can self-proclaimed 
freedom-fighters.69 Despite the shifts in judicial interpretation which have occurred, the European 
Court of Human Rights in Jobe v United Kingdom rejected a complaint that section 58(3) had 
resulted in the application of a retrospective criminal penalty.70  
 
Countering the ideology of terrorism is further addressed by offences against extremist speech and 
publications in sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. These offences react not only to the July 
2005 London bombings but also in some aspects to the Council of Europe Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism 2005.71 The principal offence in section 1(1) relates to the publication of 
statements that are ‘likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it 
is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism’ or specified offences which are referred to as 
‘Convention offences’. As for the mens rea, in section 1(2)(b), the publisher must either intend 
members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement 
to commit, prepare, or instigate acts of terrorism or specified offences, or be subjectively reckless as 
to whether members of the public will be so directly or indirectly encouraged by the statement. The 
most controversial facet of the offence is ‘indirect’ encouragement. By sub-section (3), the indirect 
encouragement of terrorism includes a statement that ‘glorifies’ the commission or preparation of 
                                                          
66 [2014] EWCA Crim 2650.  
67 Source: Home Office, Operation of Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent Legislation 
(London, 2013) Tables A05a and b.  
68 See ‘The case of Rizwaan Sabir’ The Guardian (London, 15 September 2011) 11. 
69 See R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64 para 54 (prosecution under the TA 2000, s 2). 
70 App no 48278/09, 14 June 2011, para 31. Compare J Hodgson and V Tadros, V ‘How to make a terrorist out of 
nothing’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 984. 
71 ETS 196. See E Parker ‘Implementation of the UK Terrorism Act 2006’ (2007) 21 Emory International Law Review 
711; E Barendt, ‘Incitement to, and glorification of terrorism’ in I Hare and J Weinstein (eds), Extreme Speech and 
Democracy (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009); Walker (n 11) ch 8 
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acts of terrorism or specified offences (either in their actual commission or in principle) but only if 
members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified in the 
statement is being glorified as conduct that should be ‘emulated by them in existing circumstances’. 
‘Glorify’ is partly defined in section 20(2) as including ‘praise or celebration’. Having handled the 
originators of statements in section 1, section 2(1) deals with secondary dissemination. The offence 
may be committed by a ‘terrorist publication’ such as by electronic transmission. It is a defence 
under section 2(9) to show that the statement neither expressed the publisher’s views nor had his 
endorsement. This defence can benefit ‘all legitimate librarians, academics and booksellers’72 (and 
broadcasters and bloggers) who may have examined the article but do not endorse its contents. 
There have been only 10 prosecutions up to 31 March 2013.73 As with section 58, challenges on 
human rights grounds have been rejected.74 
 
More purely preventive measures is section 3 which seeks to apply these offences in the context of 
unlawfully terrorist-related articles or records on the internet and to devise a short-circuit 
enforcement power. It was claimed that ‘extremist’ websites have proliferated,75 and that 
communication technologies represent both an important terrorist target and logistical aid. Section 
3(1) applies where the publication under section 1 or the dissemination under section 2 was 
produced electronically. The impugned materials are those which are ‘unlawfully terrorism-related’ 
under section 3(7). The short-circuit process under section 3(3) arises where a constable forms the 
opinion that material held on the system of the service provider is ‘unlawfully terrorism-related’. A 
notice can be issued which requires the provider to arrange for the material to become unavailable 
to the public and also warns the provider that failure to comply with the notice within two working 
days76 will result in the matter being regarded as being endorsed with consequent potential liability 
under sub-section (4). Critics argued that these restrictions on freedom of expression should engage 
a judicial officer at some stage so that the value of rights could be considered more explicitly than 
in the likely calculations of a commercial service provider. The government retort was that judicial 
process would cause undue delay in a ‘fast moving world’,77 though the Home Office Guidance on 
Notices Issued under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006 does seek to confine the initiation of 
notices to expert officers of the Metropolitan Police Service Counter-Terrorist Command. 
                                                          
72 Hansard (HL) vol 676, col 465 (5 December 2005), Baroness Scotland.  
73 Sources: Statistical bulletins of the Home Office and Northern Ireland Office.  
74 See Iqbal v R [2014] EWCA Crim 2650. 
75 Home Office, Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International 
Terrorism (Cm 7547, 2009) para 5.14. 
76 S 3(2), (9). 
77 Hansard (HL) vol 676, col 677 (7 December 2005), Baroness Scotland. 
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By 15 January 2015, the removal of 72,000 web items (at an increasing rate per year) had been 
prompted, though how this figure relates to alerts is not revealed.78 The potential operation of 
section 3 is curtailed by the impact of the Electronic Commerce Directive.79 More importantly, 
section 3 is bypassed by responsive action by CSPs in response to informal police requests. Indeed, 
the Guidance suggests dialogue and that a ‘voluntary approach’ should be taken where the provider 
is not viewed as encouraging publication.80 In consequence, section 3 has never been formally 
invoked. The public are also invited to sound an alert about extremism and terrorism via a 
government website which feeds into the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), 
launched by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in 2010,81 to encourage ‘a civic 
challenge against material that [the public] find offensive, even if it is not illegal.’82  
 
The shortcomings of these warning systems were highlighted by the head of Government 
Communications Headquarters (‘GCHQ’) and the UK Prime Minister in November 2014. The head 
of GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, stated that social media companies are ‘the command-and-control 
networks of choice for terrorists’, with some technology companies ‘in denial’ about the internet’s 
misuse.83 Following criticism also by the Prime Minister,84 several UK operators (BT, Virgin, Sky, 
and TalkTalk) agreed to install public reporting buttons to flag terrorist material on their services 
whilst Facebook, Google, Yahoo, and Twitter agreed to mentor smaller internet companies on 
standards of content monitoring.  
 
More difficult is to contend with overseas CSPs. No international system replicates these UK take-
down measures elsewhere, despite the dangers recognised by the EU Framework Directive on 
Combating Terrorism.85 Most extremist content is hosted by US-based CSPs. Their receptivity to 
self-censorship is lower than for European-based companies, as highlighted by the Intelligence and 
                                                          
78 Home Affairs Committee, The Roots of Violent Radicalisation (2010–12, HC 1446) para 53. It called for a code of 
conduct for ISPs: para 59. 
79 2000/31/EC. See Electronic Commerce (European Communities Directive) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2013. 
80 Paras 20, 27, Annex C. 
81 <https://www.gov.uk/report-terrorism>, last accessed 20 January 2015. See M Blain, ‘Terrorism trawlers’ (2011) 
Police Review 20 May 20. 
82 Hansard (House of Commons) vol 591 col 332, 21 January 2015. For the chronology, see 
<https://wiki.openrightsgroup.org/wiki/Counter_Terrorism_Internet_Referral_Unit?>, last accessed 20 January 2015. 
83 R Hannigan, ‘The web is a terrorist’s command-and-control network of choice’ Financial Times (London, 3 
November 2014). 
84 P Wintour, ‘UK ISPs to introduce jihadi and terror content reporting button’ The Guardian 14 November. 
85 Council Framework Decision, 2008/919/JHA, para 4. Europol encourage police cooperation through the ‘Check the 
Web’ initiative: EU Council docs 9496/06, 16532/1/06, 8457/3/07. 
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Security Committee (‘ISC’) Report on the intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee 
Rigby.86 One of the soldier’s killers, Michael Adebowale, had several of his multiple social media 
internet accounts (later revealed by the media to be operated through Facebook) closed proactively 
without official request by the CSP using an automated process because, according to GCHQ, ‘they 
hit triggers…related to their criteria for closing things down on the basis of terrorist content’.87 
Facebook also learned, on completion of a retrospective review of all his 11accounts,88 that 
Adebowale had also discussed ‘in the most explicit and emotive manner’ over Facebook’s instant 
messaging service his desire to murder a soldier.89 The ISC was critical of monitoring procedures 
by CSPs,90 though serial investigations by the Security Service were excused as sufficiently 
thorough, especially because, as pointed out even by GCHQ,91 true intent can be very difficult to 
discern from online communications. Putting aside other relevant issues around data privacy, 
accountability for surveillance, the duty of care to users, and the economic efficiency, were social 
media companies to be obliged to proactively monitor and share all postings of a violent extremist 
nature with security authorities, the former would have little time or money for anything else and 
the latter would be deluged with information and likely rendered unable to function.    
  
European initiatives 
 
Because of US constitutional distaste for restrictions on freedom of expression, the UN has 
achieved few tangible results in this field and most activity has arisen within Europe. Key 
international legal instruments addressing content have emanated from the Council of Europe - not 
only the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005 mentioned earlier but also the Convention 
on Cybercrime 2001 and the Additional Protocol 2002.92 The Protocol specifies various types of 
hate speech that should be prohibited on the internet, including racist and xenophobic materials, 
justification of genocide, and crimes against humanity. 
 
 
                                                          
86 (2014-15 HC 795).  
87 Ibid., para 384. 
88 Ibid., para 390. 
89 Ibid., para 384. 
90 Ibid., para 389. 
91 Ibid., para 393. 
92 ETS 185, 189. The US has signed the former but not the latter on First Amendment grounds. 24 member states have 
ratified (not including the UK). 
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The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (‘OSCE’) is active in this field also. Its 
Sofia Ministerial Council decided in 2004 that ‘participating States will exchange information on 
the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes and identify possible strategies to combat this threat, 
while ensuring respect for international human rights obligations and standards, including those 
concerning the rights to privacy and freedom of opinion and expression’.93 A follow-up decision 
from the OSCE’s Brussels Ministerial Council in 2006 invited participating states to ‘increase their 
monitoring of websites of terrorist/violent extremist organizations and their supporters and to 
invigorate their exchange of information.’94  Since that time, numerous OSCE events have aired 
various policy views addressing internet content control, though no new rules have been instituted 
as a result of these discussions.95  
 
As regards the European Union, terrorist uses of the internet and the risks posed by them have not 
been the subject of serious attention by its policymakers until quite recently because it is viewed as 
a relatively new issue and because the gestation of EU policy occurs at a glacial pace.96 In fact, the 
EU has worked on formulating harmonised policy on combating terrorist use of the internet since 
2006. Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism required state action to criminalise incitement of 
terrorism via the internet, including ‘public provocation to commit a terrorist offence’, as well as 
the use of the internet for recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism. Though the UK had 
passed such legislation in 2006, other countries were thus prompted to take action.97 
 
Other initiatives undertaken by the EU include ‘Check the Web’, which was launched in 2007 and 
allows states to pool data on terrorist propaganda and internet chatter at the European Police Office 
(Europol).98 The EU Commission also funded a project titled CleanIT99 to initiate ‘a structured 
public-private dialogue between government representatives, academics, Internet industry, Internet 
                                                          
93 OSCE Ministerial Council, Sofia, 2004, Decision No. 3/04: Combating the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes. 
94 OSCE Ministerial Council, Brussels, 2006, Decision No. 7/06: Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist 
Purposes. 
95 See OSCE, ‘Expert Workshop on Combating the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes’ (Vienna, 13–14 October 
2005); OSCE-Council of Europe, ‘Expert Workshop on Preventing Terrorism: Fighting Incitement and Related 
Terrorist Activities’ (Vienna, 19–20 October 2006). 
96J Argomaniz, ‘European Union responses to terrorist use of the Internet’ (2014) Cooperation and Conflict (Online) 5. 
97See F Galli and A Weyembergh, EU Counter-terrorism Offences: What impact on national legislation and case-law? 
(University of Brussels, Brussels 2012). 
98 See Article 36 Committee, Council Conclusions on cooperation to combat terrorist use of the Internet (‘Check the 
Web’) (8457/3/07 REV 3, 2007).  
99 See <http://cleanitproject.eu/>, last accessed 20 January 2015. 
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users and non-governmental organisations in the European Union’ on ‘Reducing terrorist use of the 
Internet’. Its final product was a report on conditions for action, plus best practices .100 It has been 
argued that the real value of the CleanIT project resided in the fact that ‘it has turned the spotlight 
on a wider problem: the [European] Commission’s reliance on industry solutions to address 
problems that are badly defined by policymakers from the very beginning’.101  
 
Large-scale technologically-facilitated blocking and unattributed take-downs  
 
Discussion up to now has focused largely on legislated or voluntary content removals. In addition, 
states are not technologically impotent when faced with terrorists seeking to use the internet, 
especially not powerful states with large defence budgets and advanced technological capabilities. 
Thus, states can seek to constrain the effectiveness of these cyber-based strategies by limiting user 
and audience access to online platforms through control of the internet infrastructure. The common 
element for governmental filtering is generally an index of websites that citizens are blocked from 
accessing. If a website appears on this list, access can be blocked. Filtering of content is carried out 
in many countries, such as China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, and in some cases, CSPs are 
pressured to apply blocks. In the final week of December 2014, for example, the government of 
India instituted a block on 32 major websites including software code repository Github, video 
streaming sites Vimeo and Dailymotion, the Internet Archive, and many others, on the basis of their 
hosting what Arvind Gupta, head of Information Technology for India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata 
Party, called ‘Anti India content from ISIS’. Five sites (weebly.com, vimeo.com, Pastebin, 
dailymotion.com and gist.github.com) were unblocked after agreeing to remove ‘Anti-India’ 
content.102 
 
Finally, in terms of ‘negative’ measures, an even more drastic content control approach is to use 
cyber-attack methods. Today there are between two and five so-called ‘top tier’ jihadi forums.103 
Forums are considered ‘top tier’ that receive new and authentic content for distribution from Al-
Qa’ida’s Al-Sahab media production outlet and other important producers. These forums are thus 
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the subject of fairly routine attacks that can result in their being offline for days, weeks, or even 
months.104 It is not known what or who is responsible for these outages, but many assume they are 
the work of one or more states’ intelligence agencies. Such attack strategies have been criticised by 
those who argue that violent extremist online forums and other violent extremist cyberspaces can 
serve as valuable providers of open source intelligence for states’ intelligence agencies.105 
 
‘Positive’ Online Measures  
 
Generally less contentious are ‘positive’ online counter-terrorism measures that employ online 
engagement and outreach rather than content controls to stem the encouragement of violence. Most 
contemporary such campaigns focus upon social media which target youth, since they are believed 
to be particularly vulnerable to violent online political extremist rhetoric. This work is often 
undertaken by non-governmental organizations and individual activists, including young people 
themselves; although some such campaigns have also been undertaken by state agencies. 
 
Within the realm of state interventions, shortly after 11 September 2001, the UK domestic Security 
Service (MI5) took the unprecedented step of posting an appeal for information about potential 
terrorists on dissident Arab websites.106 The message, in Arabic, was placed on sites that the 
authorities knew were accessed by extremists, including Islah.org, a Saudi Arabian opposition site, 
and Qoqaz.com, a Chechen site that advocated jihad. MI5 were hopeful of eliciting information 
from persons on the margins of extremist groups or communities who were sufficiently shocked by 
the events of 11 September 2001 to want to contact the agency. The agency had intended to post the 
message on a further 15 sites known to be accessed by radicals, but many of these were shut down 
by the FBI in the aftermath of the attacks. Later, in 2007, the UK Home Office established the 
Research Information and Communications Unit (‘RICU’) as a cross-departmental strategic 
communications body based at its Office for Security and Counter-terrorism; RICU seeks to 
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coordinate government communication activities to counter violent extremism while promoting 
inter-community relations.107 
 
Another ‘positive’ government agency initiative is the US State Department’s Centre for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communications’ (‘CSCC’) ‘Think Again Turn Away’ social media campaign. 
The CSCC was established in 2010, ‘to coordinate, orient, and inform government-wide foreign 
communications activities targeted against terrorism and violent extremism, particularly al-Qaeda, 
and its affiliates and adherents…The Digital Outreach Team actively and openly engages in Arabic, 
Urdu, Punjabi, and Somali to counter terrorist propaganda and misinformation about the United 
States across a wide variety of interactive digital environments that had previously been ceded to 
extremists’.108 The CSCC is both praised and vilified for ‘Think Again Turn Away,’ an English 
language social media campaign that commenced in December 2013, whose mission is described on 
its Facebook page as ‘to expose the facts about terrorists and their propaganda’. In addition to its 
Facebook presence, the campaign is also active on Ask.fm, Google+, Tumblr, Twitter, and 
YouTube where it disseminates content that addresses the same grievances as those in extremist 
content, including in some instances creating ‘mash-ups’ of IS content and re-circulating it. Many 
commentators view the CSCC’s online activity as a drop in the ocean compared to the likes of IS, 
but as essentially harmless; others describe CSCC activity as ‘embarrassing’ and ‘ineffective’.109   
 
In 2012, the EU established its Radicalisation Awareness Network (‘RAN’) under Directorate 
General Home Affairs to dissuade people from participating in violent extremism and terrorism or 
to persuade them to separate themselves from such ideas and methods in the first place.110 The RAN 
is composed of eight working groups—composed of researchers, activists, and CVE practitioners 
(to name a few) — one of which, RAN@, is tasked with ‘develop[ing] frontline partnerships around 
the collation, creation, and dissemination of counter-[violent extremist] and alternative-narratives 
through the Internet and social media’. Other RAN working groups have also discussed using the 
internet to reach out to publics; RAN Voices of Victims of Terrorism has, for example, expressed a 
desire to have the voices of terrorism victims amplified via the internet and social media. 
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Finally, private actors have challenged violent jihadism online. Some are heavily backed by 
government,111 but others have been initiated by individuals and non-governmental organizations. 
Their denunciations or alternative interpretations have taken many different forms, ranging from 
online video and other online responses denouncing violent extremism by scholars112 and imams to 
wide-ranging multimedia campaigns such as ‘My Jihad’,113 from ordinary individuals uploading 
videos to YouTube to more general macro-level positive messaging about Islam targeted at children 
and youth such as Naif al-Mutawa’s comic and animated series, ‘The 99’.114 A particularly 
interesting example is Abdullah-X, a series of online animated shorts developed by a former 
extremist, which received support from RAN@ and Google.115 The developer’s status as a former 
extremist probably lends the project greater credibility than some of those described earlier, and the 
site may be more accessible and appealing to youth than most state-sponsored campaigns.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Given that the internet is part of the infrastructure of contemporary everyday life in the same way as 
supermarkets and motorways, it is misguided to make responsiblity on the internet for the aberrant 
terrorist usage of a small minority or to require that they should treat everyone as an equal risk and 
potential suspect. Nevertheless, even with the price being paid by extensive criminal offences, 
intrusion into free speech activities, and the running of new bureaucracies and programmes of 
funding, one can feel assured that not all terrorism will be averted. The acculturalization of 
immigrant communities in Western values and lifestyles will prove very difficult owing to the 
perceived shallowness of those lifestyles and the hypocrisy in the official adherence to proclaimed 
values. It is also difficult to compete in the market place of ideas against the narratives of jihadism 
which speak in simplistic, hedonistic, and graphic language not available to official spokespersons. 
As a result, the dismal prospect is that, no matter how much the state strives to counter international 
terrorism, current emanations of violent extremism will take generations to assuage. 
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